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Intro  
This paper is about a new project I have just started. So far, I have mainly worked with Dutch 
sources, but this is such an international subject that I’d like to broaden the project, preferably in 
some kind of collaboration. So the whole setup is up for discussion; and if you are interested in 
cooperation or know of others who are doing similar work, I’d be very interested. 
 
Research question, concepts 
After World War II, many politicians, intellectuals and journalists in Europe and the US believed 
that society was entering a new era. They spoke of a second  industrial revolution, driven 
forward by electronic computers (some added nuclear power – we will leave that out here for the 
sake of brevity). This kind of rhetoric is well-known since the early nineteenth century: the idea 
that a new society was emerging that differed fundamentally from the past1; and technology as a 
driving force: think of  Saint-Simon’s  “industrial society”, and Carlyle’s “Mechanical Age” 
(later: ‘railroad age’, ‘electrical age’, etc). They were attempts to catch the essence of the new 
situation: rough simplifications, but put forward by very smart people: Saint-Simon, Carlyle, and 
for the second industrial revolution we could quote luminaries like Norbert Wiener, J.D. Bernal, 
CP Snow and many others. Such terms lend themselves very well for popularization, because 
they give people a quick interpretation of the bewildering changes they are going through. And 
the men that coin them could be called opinion leaders. 
Another term that I find useful is the German word Leitbild (guiding image). Historian 
Hans-Luidger Dienel defines it as: a positive image of the future that is more practical than a 
vision or a dream, because it refers to what can be created; it provides people with a common 
                                                          
1 Koselleck’s basic insight. Also Hoelscher, Entdeckung der Zukunft. 
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understanding and a common goal for action.2 As examples he mentions rationalization in 
business or sustainable development. The opposite are ‘Schreckbilder’: images of a future we all 
wish to avoid, such as inflation, or, depending where you stand, communism. The coming of the 
automation age could be a Leitbild, OR a Schreckbild.  
I am interested in the way such images, which are usually developed by intellectuals, 
enter the public sphere. 
Therefore my research question: How common was this idea of a second industrial 
revolution, driven forward by computers and automation? What exactly was the content of this 
idea and what were the forces that shaped it? 
 
Sources, method 
I want to approach this as an international subject: 
● computers and automation spread very quickly during the fifties and sixties, and one may 
expect that they raised similar questions in different countries, although answers might differ per 
country 
● the source I use as a starting point are weekly illustrated magazines, such as Life in the US, 
Paris Match in France, or Asahigrafu in Japan. What I like about these magazines as a source3: 
● These magazines were very popular: you can be sure they reached a large part of the 
population. 
● much competition between them so you may assume that they were well attuned to the 
preferences of their readers 
● They allow you to follow the development of your theme week by week. 
● They were very similar in different countries, because they imitated each other, and often used 
the same or similar pictures and stories. So you can ask questions like: was “the age of 
automation” conceived in similar ways in different countries? Was there convergence or 
divergence over time? How important were national peculiarities?  
                                                          
2 H.-L. Dienel, “Bilder und Leitbilder der Technik” ms 2004 (I have not seen a published version of this. 
Should ask him). 
 
3 Spelled out in van Lente (ed), The nuclear age in popular media (Palgrave 2012). 
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[Together with six colleagues, I have done a similar study on nuclear technologies in 8 countries: 
appeared last year at Palgrave: The nuclear age in popular media] 
 
Historiography 
Recently several studies have appeared about the international diffusion of computers – usually 
written by economic or business historians, but several of them have taken account of cultural 
factors. What can we learn from them?4 
                                                          
4 Based on:  P. Paju, H. Durnova, ‘Computing close to the Iron Curtain. Inter/national computing 
practices in Czechoslovakia and Finland, 1945-1970’, Comparative technology transfer and society 7/3 
(dec 2009), 303-322. 
P. Paju, ‘National projects and international users: Finland and early European computerization’, IEEE 
Annals of the history of computing (okt-dec 2008), 77-91. 
G. Alberts, ‘Appropriating America: Americanization in the history of European computing’, IEEE Annals 
of the history of computing april-june 2010, 4-7. 
W. Aspray, ’International diffusion of computer technology, 1945-1955’, Annals of the history of 
computing 8/4 (1986) 351-360. 
A.van den Bogaard, H. Lintsen, F. Veraart, O. de Wit (red), De eeuw van de computer. De geschiedenis 
van de informatietechnologie in Nederland (Stichting Historie der Techniek, Deventer: Kluwer 2008). 
J.W. Cortada, ‘Patterns and practices in how information technology spread around the world’, IEEE 
Annals of the Hist of Computing  (Oct-Dec 2008), 4-25. 
P. Edwards, The closed world. Computers and the politics of discourse in Cold War America (Cambridge, 
Mass: MIT Press 1997). 
F. Dittmann, ‘Microelectronics under socialism’, Icon 8 (2002), 43-54. 
T. Friedman, Electric dreams: Computers in American Culture (New York: New York University Press, 
2005).  
S. Gerowitsch, ‘Kyberkratie oder Kyberbürokratie in der Sowjetunion‘, In B. Greiner (Hg), Geist und 
Macht im Kalten Krieg (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition 2011), 376-395. 
David P. Julyk, “The Trouble With Machines Is People.” The Computer as Icon in Post-War America: 1946-
1970 (PhD thesis University of Michigan, 2008. Typoscript). 
Arthe van Laer, ‘Developing an EC computer policy, 1965-1974’, IEEE Annals Hist of Computing 32/1 
(2010), 44-59. 
E. Medina, Cybernetic revolutionaries. Technology and politics in Allende’s Chile (Cambridge, Mass: MIT 
Press 2011). 
D. Mindell, J. Segal, S Gerovitch, ‘From communications engineering to communications science. 
Cybernetics and information theory in the United States, France, and the Soviet Union’, in M. Walker 
(ed), Science and ideology. A comparative history (London: Routledge 2003), 66-96. 
R. Kline, ‘Cybernetics, management science, and technology policy. The emergence of “Information 
Technology” as a keyword, 1948-1985’, Techn & Cult 47/. (juli 2006), 513-. 
C. Schlombs, ‘Engineering international expansion: IBM and Remington Rand in European computer 
markets’, IEEE Annals Hist of Computing (oct-dec 2008), 42-58. 
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● There was a lot of talk about an imminent ‘full automation of the economy’, but in fact, 
automation was a very complicated process, with many failures. Therefore: don’t take stories 
about computers and automation in the popular press as reflections of what was really going on.  
● This has to do with the fact that, strange as it may seem, the themes of automation and thinking 
machines was not new at all. Statues of humans that move as if they are alive go back to 
antiquity. The question if thought might be a mechanism like the body has been on the agenda 
since Descartes. And feedback control mechanisms were used already in windmills and steam 
engines. Therefore, much of the postwar debate was a continuation of much older Leitbilder and 
Schreckbilder.5 
● It may be more fruitful therefore to inquire which individuals and groups served as ‘opinion 
leaders’, what their interests and motives were, and how such ideas entered popular culture. For 
example: 
● The American firm IBM was very active and successful in promoting its products in Europe. 
Did its marketing efforts influence the public image of computers? 
● How is this related with the image of ‘the American way of life’, which included American 
management styles, rationalization and automation? Was this a Leitbild or a Schreckbild?  
● On the other hand, some countries emphasized their unique national character. France is the 
most obvious example: it tried to develop its own nuclear reactor as well as its own type of 
computers, claimed that cybernetics was really a French invention, and so on. All to distinguish 
itself from the US and show its grandeur.6 Finland is another interesting case: it developed its 
technological prowess in order to be independent of its big neighbors Germany and Russia. 
Images from the national epic Kalevala were used to drive the message home.7 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
C. Caetano, E. Pauer (Hg), Roboter als Zukunftsboten – Aspekte einer Kulturgeschichte der Roboter in 
Japan special issue Technikgeschichte 77/4 (2010). 
5 See Wikipedia, ‘List of fictional robots and androids’ and ‘List of fictional computers’. D. Bourg, ‘Les 
robots, les dieux, les animaux et nous’ in Et l’homme créa le robot (Paris: Musée des arts et métiers, 
2012), 85; R. Sims, Der mechanische Mensch (Zürich: , ). 
6 Mindell o.c. 
7 Paju o.c. 
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Summarizing: 
● I am interested in Leitbilder and Schreckbilder of automation, computers and robots (three 
terms that are often combined in the popular media). 
● which dominated: the positive or the negative? 
● how did they relate to the past: did they emphasize continuity with old images of 
mechanization and thinking machines? Or did they speak of a revolution, the beginning of a new 
era? 
● was the future imagined as a kind of idealized, or despised America? Or was a national future 
imagined? Or perhaps a generalized modernism towards which all mankind would converge? 
● who were the opinion leaders? What were their motives? How did their ideas filter through in 
the popular press? 
 
The Dutch case  
Let me begin with opinion leaders. For the sake of brevity, I will focus upon only one: Fred 
Polak (1907-1985), a high ranking official and government adviser; former student of Tinbergen, 
the great mathematical economist.8 In 1949 he became part-time professor of sociology in 
Rotterdam. The theme of his inauguration speech was the social impact of automation and 
computers, which he called, like Norbert Wiener, a second industrial revolution. Two core 
developments: Industry, he believed, was on its way to ‘full automation’. And the new science of 
cybernetics was the leading direction in the social sciences. The goal of this new science was a 
fully numerically controlled society, and the means to achieve this were mathematical modeling 
of everything, from machines to human beings to society (‘sociometrics’ similar to his teacher 
Tinbergen’s ‘econometrics’).  
Polak was not a man for details. He said that mass media would enhance the mechanical 
character of culture, without explaining what exactly he meant. However, this was common talk 
at the time: famous psychiatrist Erich Fromm wrote about ‘automaton conformity’ in western 
                                                          
8 F.L. Polak, De wentelgang der wetenschap en de maatschappij van morgen (2e uitgebreide druk, 
Stenfert Kroese, Leiden [1950]; idem, Prognostica; idem, with H.F. van Loon, Gesprek met morgen. Also 
in general intellectual journals such as the leading one, De Gids (e.g. 1952, p. 58-64: Polak was one of 
the ‘prominent Dutchmen’ who were asked to comment upon ‘our times’) and newspapers such as NRC. 
His work was commented on by other prominent intellectuals in the same and similar media. 
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societies, and a little later Charles Wright Mills spoke of the typical western citizen as a ‘cheerful 
robot’ – and several Dutch writers spoke in similar terms.9  
 For Polak, the fully-automated society was a Schreckbild, and America was going that 
way. A counter-force should be created by social scientists like himself, and their work should be 
amply funded by the government. He did not present an alternative, a more attractive Leitbild, 
and certainly not a specifically Dutch perspective, like the French and the Fins. In his later 
publications, he spoke of a European rather than a Dutch future society. 
 
Panorama  
Panorama was the most popular of Dutch illustrated magazines for a general public (only 
women’s magazines were even more popular). It was more widely read than any newspaper, and 
marketing research shows that it reached all kinds of people in terms of age, sex and social class. 
I have gone through all the weekly issues and collected articles, photo’s with captions, cartoons 
and readers’ letters on the themes of automation, computers and robots. Here are some simple 
statistics:  
 
                                                          
9 Beets en Tolhoek in W&S. 
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- Two peaks in interest: the early fifties and the late sixties. The more serious articles 
clustered slightly later in the fifties and, also, late sixties. 
- Robots were the most popular subject, throughout, but esp in the 50s.  
So let’s start with them. Everyone talks about robots these days, said Panorama in 1952. Robots, 
usually made by amateur technicians, appeared at markets and exhibitions. Robot orchestras 
were popular – here in a kind of puppet show for children in Japan, and a dancing orchestra in a 
bar in Antwerp, Belgium.  
8 
 
 
The word ‘robot’ was used for all kinds of automatic machinery, whether or not it looked 
like a human being – e.g. a ‘robot elevator’ (elevator without a boy to operate it). Computers 
were also sometimes called robots.  
Words like automaton, automatic, automation were also very popular. Instead of many 
examples just one cartoon (28 okt 67), in which a woman has just bought a new item and tells 
her husband: ‘I don’t know what it is, but it is automatic and we don’t have it yet’.  
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There were serious articles about robots too, e.g. machines with remote control, 
developed for use in, for example, nuclear reactors; and also on the first robots with feedback 
controls, e.g. by Grey Walter in Britain and Albert Ducrocq in France. In most of these articles, 
there was no sense of threat, as in Polak’s publications, but rather of amazement at the ingenuity, 
and helpfulness of these new machines and gadgets.  
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 Were robots and automation presented as bringing about a revolution? Usually, no, even 
the contrary. Esp during the 50s, Panorama made a point of showing that ‘robots are nothing 
new’. For example, the famous mechanical dolls by Droz in Switzerland, that ‘still cause 
amazement in this century of technology’, linked present-day robots to this tradition that I 
mentioned. 
 So was there really nothing new? A few articles pointed out that what distinguished 
recent robots from the older mechanical dolls was that they could ‘think’, that is, react to the 
environment, take decisions, and learn from experience. Some articles discussed the 
phenomenon of ‘emergent behavior’ that had been studied by Grey Walter and others. The most 
frightening article was about a new American guided missile, Nike, which could find, follow and 
destroy a fast maneuvering airplane. This article ended with speculating about the prospect of a 
‘push-button war’ in which ‘mechanical brains will fight each other’: automation ending in mass 
destruction.  
  Panorama was much more optimistic about another great issue in the fifties: 
technological unemployment caused by automation. It said that certainly jobs would be lost, but 
the process would be gradual, new and more interesting jobs would be created, and there would 
be more leisure time.  
Overall, during the fifties we find no coherent Leitbild as in the work of the intellectuals, 
but we do note significant differences with the intellectual discourse. Panorama never wrote 
about the prospect of men becoming robots or society a machine. It quoted experts from the 
United States, but also from other countries. In most articles the future looked like a 
technological paradise, not specifically an American paradise or a recognizably Dutch one, but a 
kind of generalized, even ecumenical modernism, as in this article, that pictured, side by side, 
Russian passenger planes and American skyscrapers. 
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At the end of the fifties there was a slackening of interest, but a new wave followed soon. 
For example, the director of a large publishing firm that specialized in popular science and 
technology said: ‘we are at the beginning of a computer era.’10 Computers, he believed, would 
enter the home (he was thinking of terminals of large mainframes located in some central 
location). Therefore, together with Philips, the electronics form, he produced a series of cheap 
books on computers, to help build up a market.  
In Panorama, two longer articles appeared at the end of the sixties which offered radically 
opposite perspectives: 
One (‘67) described, with great enthusiasm, the grand visions of American experts on 
Artificial Intelligence (it talked about the prospect of a ‘world brain’ which integrated human and 
machine intelligence). The other article, written by the famous Italian journalist Oriana Fallaci, 
was a portrait of the three American astronauts who accomplished the first landing on the moon 
(july 69). It was entirely negative. It portrayed the astronauts as cold, technology-obsessed 
‘robots’. Spaceflight served as a metonym for the a future world that would be dominated by 
technology, and boring people like Neil Armstrong. In fact, this was the, by that time, well-worn 
image of a ‘brave new world’, ‘filled in’ with the story of space flight.  
                                                          
10 KDC, Nijmegen, archives of Spectrum, nrs 873, 2481, 3087. 
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Conclusions  
Tentative, because my sample of articles is still so small:  
● Contrary to what is often said (e.g. Ceruzzi, Hist of modern comp, p. 3), it was not the popular 
press but leading intellectuals who made the most dramatic predictions for the future – the idea 
of a second industrial revolution as the greatest upheaval in history and so on. Why? In the case 
of Polak, his need for funds to get his prognostics project under way was certainly a factor 
(Wiener, although well established, also tried to launch a new super-science, cybernetics). 
Panorama, on the other hand, emphasized continuity, at least during the fifties. It did sometimes 
point out the newness of electronic feedback control, but it refrained from talk about men as 
robots and society as a machine. This seems to have changed in the late sixties: then the tone 
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became more dramatic, both on the positive and on the negative side. Explanation? One might 
speculate that it wanted to put people at ease, but in the case of nuclear technologies, the 
magazine often painted a very disturbing picture of the future. 
● Again, during the 1950s, America was usually neither a real Leitbild nor a Schreckbild 
(although we have met some exceptions). It was a major source of examples and expertise, but 
experts from several other countries, including the NL, were quoted as well. The future looked 
‘modern’, not particularly American, but not Dutch either, and the problem of national identity 
was never raised, as it was in France and Finland. 
● Overall, the prospects of automation were much less pessimistic than those of nuclear 
technology – the other cluster of innovations that were believed to shape the future. Compared to 
the intense fears of nuclear war and of radiation, worries about unemployment were slight, and 
prospects of robots taking control, or of a world-wide brain probably sounded more like science 
fiction than as a real threat or promise. 
● In the sixties: turn towards more dramatic prospects both + and -. 
